| | | | MARKAR ESAYAN
m.esayan@todayszaman.com | ![]() |
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| | | Turkey has been changing radically in recent years. The dynamic for this change has been created by two large groups, the devout Muslim base and Kurds. | |
Serious mistakes and wrong choices made during the years of the formation of the republic wound up condemning Turkey to nearly a century in a straightjacket. Yes, a new country was formed, but upon an ideology that rejected the very people of the nation. I am not someone who views the republic years as categorically negative. But the essential character of something often determines direction and choice. And I can say with ease that the Kemalist republic had a malevolent character. We still see now that mistakes made in that era are slowing us down.
Where the minorities are concerned, for example ...
The final stage of the Ottoman era was an unmitigated disaster for everyone in the empire. As a matter of fact, the end of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century were like a living hell for minorities. And the same sort of dark periods that were experienced in Turkey during these times happened all over the world. When the new Republic of Turkey was formed, the Armenians, Greeks, Arameans, Jewish people, and other non-Muslims who had managed to survive all dreamed of a new beginning. And they were right to get caught up in this dream. Because after all, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his men all asserted that they were forming a modern, secular and democratic new country, and received the praise of the world in doing so. And while they maintained this about the new country, it really didn't turn out that way in practice.
Peace with PUKFirst, peace was made with the bloody-handed members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1914 and 1915, with the bureaucracy of the state being turned over to their hands. At this point, everyone had to be a Turk, and embrace the identity given to them by the state. And then the feelings of guilt from 1915 were transformed into hatred for Armenians and other minorities. No more large massacres could be carried out, but the minorities could be brought to their knees economically-speaking, with constant harassment from the state. The population was on its way to becoming more homogenous, as assimilating Kurds and Muslims was easy business anyway.
While Mustafa Kemal Atatürk asserted that he was forming a people's republic, the real truth was that he was forming a republic that belonged to a privileged minority. Minorities were fleeing abroad due to economic harassment and incidents like those that took place in Thrace in 1934. How interesting it was then that the Lausanne Treaty, seen as the sacred forming text of the republic, was being so regularly violated by the Turkish state itself. And in the meantime, a new state religion was created, one that only appeared to be Muslim, but which had been purged of spirituality and was quite secular and used the Sunni belief system as the center. It was actually a new religion. Yes, the Kemalists had created this religion and to spread it, they formed the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Homilies designated by the state were read in all the mosques of the country, with religion being used as a tool to promote the state's ideology. The goal here was to see Muslims no longer as a “threat,” but to instead “civilize” them and assimilate their masses.
As for the West, for as long as Turkey stayed within the parameters of the West club, it didn't matter what sorts of violations of human right were being carried out.
The Muslims had pulled back. But it appeared that the Kurds were going to be a big problem. There were so many of them, and they were generally quite religious. In fact, some of the most important religious figures that were preventing this new state-created religion from taking root throughout the region were Kurds like Said Nursi. It appeared the Kurds were both racially and religiously speaking resisting assimilation. In the 1924 Sheikh Said rebellion, the 1930 Ağrı rebellion and the 1937-1938 Dersim “uprising,” the state rained down great tyranny on the people, later trying to sell these incidents as serious uprisings that needed to be quelled. What was really going on though was a serious resistance to the founding principles of the regime, as well as to societal engineering. And, as occurred in Dersim, state violence led to more protests, and more protests led to thousands of deaths.
There is a general sort of hypocrisy that exists in Turkey. The above-described stories were always treated as though they had occurred in different eras and different countries. Atatürk was kept separate from any nasty business, with mistakes that he made only thrown into the public arena after his death. As it was told, everything was just fine until 1938, but Atatürk's immoral successors ruined everything that had been going so well. In fact, everything that went wrong was blamed on İsmet İnönü, while Atatürk was kept clean. And when really pressed, those holding to this argument point to the “conditions of the era.” Some even claim, “With the Jewish Holocaust going on in Europe, what took place in Turkey could even be seen as democracy.” As though the entire world was populated solely by Nazis at the time, or that there were no examples of democratic countries.
No one can claim that Kemalism was not able to create a society, or that Kemalist social engineering was a complete failure. And what's more, this was not only true for those city-dwellers getting by because of the state. Everyone, from those able to build homes on free state plots of land to those richer folks able to impound minority goods, got their share of benefits from Kemalism. As for the Alevis, despite their experience from the Dersim massacre, they were scared off by radical Islamism, tying themselves completely in response to this to the Kemalist state, and its party, the CHP. The reasoning here seemed to be that while the Kemalists might brush shoulders with violence every now and then -- as seen in Dersim --this was nothing compared to Sharia, which held the potential (thought the Alevis) to completely eliminate them. The state did not hang back from keeping this fear alive either, using countless provocations to achieve this aim. By turning Turks, Kurds, Alevis, Muslims, Armenians, secularists, leftists and so on against one another, Kemalism was easily able to construct a guardian authority over the people of the country.
The Kemalist guardian authority's advantageOn the cusp of the millenium, Turkey experienced an open-ended post-modern coup. During the coup of 1960, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had been hung, with clashes between rightists and leftists leading to the deaths of thousands of youths. It was always the Kemalist guardian authority that emerged in an advantageous position from these incidents.
So who was to change the order of things?
The great social power forces left far from the center and the ruling seats were the Muslims and the Kurds. There was nothing else left. The number of minorities in Turkey had shrunk to one thousandth of their previous numbers and had turned inwards in reaction to the events of the past. The Alevis were paralyzed as a result of the false “Sunni” danger, and their own splintering. In the meantime, let us add that area citizens did in fact voluntarily support the state-rooted provocations -- like in Madımak, an attack in which Alevis were targeted and killed. After all, our goal here is not to aestheticize history. There is still a widespread antipathy towards Alevis throughout Turkey, and this is a factor which has always worked out very well for the deep state and its business.
In the wake of the Feb. 28, 1997 post modern coup, a respectful uprising against Necmettin Erbakan took place in the ranks of the reformist cadres of the overturned Welfare Party (RP), after which the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was formed. The founders of this new party, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç carried out a serious set of self-criticisms, in light of lessons learned from the 1997 coup process. What was emerging was an Anatolian Muslim voter threshold more at peace with the West, taking more of a leadership role in democracy, and open to change as well as to reform. Millions of people kept at arm's length from power throughout the history of the republic thus far suddenly had a voice, without having to turn to violence, and without losing their patience. In its first election, the AK Party took power on Nov. 3, 2002, picking up huge levels of support from Kurds as well as secular democrats. A silent revolution had thus begun in Turkey. The revolution that had begun was one to rely not on violence and upheaval, but on democratic methods and parliamentary representation. Of course, it was also a period that would require some time and patience.
Now the AK Party is headed into its fourth election. And the prime minister has taken a great risk, starting an historical initiative involving the greatest weapons possessed by the guardian authority, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Kurdish problem. In the meantime now, this same ruling party is engaging in a number of imposed-from-above projects like the chopping down of trees in Taksim's Gezi Park to make way for a shopping center and other similarly bad projects. In addition, new changes in regulations like the Court of Auditors Law are very discomforting. But it does appear that in general, the weighty role played by Muslims and Kurds under the mantle of the AK Party will continue to make its mark on Turkey, as the country is carried into the future. What this means is that the revolution is set to continue. Let me say here that the guarantee for this mission lies in the desire and the energy of the threshold of voters who support this revolution and the fact that the AK Party is aware it needs to fulfill these things.
The biggest risk for the AK Party will be when it is unable to reflect the energy of its voter base in its own politics. At the same time, it is important that the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the secular factions not be scared off. One significant example of this is the new alcohol regulations passed by Parliament. I am not someone who believes that this new law threatens a modern life style. Aside from a couple of objections I hold, I do think this is a law quite similar to those found in other countries, much like laws concerning the sales of cigarettes. At the same time though, given the tremendous levels of polarization in Turkey, it probably would have been wiser to postpone this law's passage.
Turkey looks set for exciting times until 2020. And I do believe that in another decade or so, we will see a different state along with the emergence of an opposition with a different sort of flavor. We will just have to keep on living and see this all unfold. |
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